Abstract. Many cryptographic primitives rely on word rotations (R) and xor (X) to provide proper mixing. We give RX-system mixing a very general treatment and deduce some theoretical results on related probability distributions. Pure RX-systems are easy to break, so we show how to apply our theory to a more complex system that uses RX operations in combination with S-boxes. We construct an impractical (keystream complexity 2 90.9 ), but new and non-trivial distinguisher for a variant of HC-128 for which modular addition is replaced with xor.
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Introduction
Consider the Xorrotation family g w,r 1 ,...,rn (x) = x ⊕ (x ≪ r 1 ) ⊕ . . . ⊕ (x ≪ r n ) of functions for which x is a w-bit word, ⊕ denotes xor and ≪ denotes left rotation (cyclic shift) with respect to the word length w. For the rotation amounts r i we have 0 < r i < w. These bit mixing functions are often used in cryptographic primitives to provide intra-word diffusion.
While primitives that rely on modular addition (A), rotation (R) and xor (X) are commonly labeled ARX, g w,r 1 ,...,rn is RX. Pure AX-and RXsystems have been shown to be weak, see [3, 8] , but we will show how our theory can be used in practice by applying it to a more complex system that includes RX operations and S-boxes.
The Xorrotation function family was studied by Thomsen [11] and Rivest [9] . Thomsen showed that the mapping is invertible for all choices of distinct r i with 0 ≤ r i < w, and all word lengths w = 2 k if n is odd. Very recently, Rivest gave a different and more general proof, a proof that in some sense reveals the true nature of the invertibility of the mapping.
Many questions remain open, however. For example, some insight into the cases w = 2 k and even n, separately and together, would be desirable.
While the main focus of Thomsen and Rivest was on invertibility, we are more interested in the probability distributions that g w,r 1 ,...,rn induce. That is, given an x chosen uniformly at random, what can we say about g w,r 1 ,...,rn (x) for different values of w and r i , how much do the resulting probability distributions differ from the uniform one? To answer this question we will need some more information about the function than an assessment of its invertibility.
From a cryptanalytic perspective, a primitive that exposes a heavily biased probability distribution is prone to distinguishing attacks. This motivates the main goal of this paper, which is to show a few very general results on the probability distributions of Xorrotations. We will then show how to apply our findings toward a cryptanalysis of the eSTREAM final portfolio stream cipher HC-128 [12] designed by Wu. There have been very few cryptanalytic results on HC-128. In Wu's design paper [12] , a distinguisher was constructed based on analysis of the least significant bit of the 32-bit keystream words. The keystream complexity of his distinguisher was about 2 160.5 32-bit words according to the revised analysis of Stankovski et al. [10] . In that paper they constructed a new distinguisher with a keystream complexity of about 2 152.5 , which is the current best for the original HC-128. Other observations and attempts at HC-128 can be found in [2, [4] [5] [6] [7] .
Contributions of This Paper
In this paper we present a general treatment of bit mixing using xor and word rotations. We deduce a few simple theoretical results on related probability distributions, results that can be used for cryptanalysis.
We further show how to apply the theory, together with some additional new observations, to produce a new analysis of a variant of the eSTREAM final portfolio stream cipher HC-128. While the keystream complexity of the resulting distinguisher is far from practical (2 90.9 ), these are the first results for the given HC-128 variant.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first review distinguishers and hypothesis testing before showing some theoretical results on biased probability distributions and bit mixing using xor and word rotations. In Section 3 we apply the theory from the previous section by constructing a new distinguisher for the variant of HC-128 in which addition is replaced with xor. The paper is concluded in Section 4.
Biased and RX-Specific Probability Distributions

Reviewing Distinguishers and Relative Entropy
A distinguisher is a decision mechanism that takes n samples of keystream as input and outputs either "CIPHER" or "RANDOM". The decision mechanism uses the n input samples to perform a hypothesis test to determine which of the two known probability distributions that is more likely, that of the cipher, or the uniform one. The Neyman-Pearson Lemma (see [1] ) provides the optimal hypothesis test, which is translated into Definition 1 for independent samples.
For a probability mass function P , we use square bracket notation P [x] here to denote the probability of event x.
Definition 1 (Relative entropy). The relative entropy between two probability mass functions P 0 and P 1 over the same domain X is defined as
Relative entropy has a couple of aliases in literature; information divergence and Kullback-Leibler distance. In our paper we will sometimes say 'the divergence of P ' meaning D(P U ), where U denotes the corresponding uniform distribution.
The error probabilities for the corresponding hypothesis test reach the point at which they start to decrease exponentially when the number of samples n used in the hypothesis test approaches
In this paper, (2) will be used as a measure of the number of samples needed for our distinguisher. This is the same measure that was used in [10] .
The time-and keystream complexities of the distinguisher depend on how the observed keystream is used to assemble the samples. In our application, as we will see in Section 3, this assembly is very fast, requiring only four xor operations to build one sample.
The Divergence of Probabilistically Biased Distributions
We will be using probabilistic equalities in conjunction with the divergence measure D, so we need to determine how the former influence the latter.
Definition 2 (Probabilistically biased distribution). Let A be any distribution of size 2 w , and let U be the uniform distribution of the same size. A distribution resulting from sampling A with probability p and U with probability 1 − p is said to be probabilistically biased with parameters (p, A), or (p, A)-biased.
Theorem 1 is proven in the full version of this paper.
RX-induced Probability Distributions
Consider the function
where x is a w-bit variable and ≪ denotes left rotation with respect to the word length w. For all rotation amounts r in this section we enforce the constraint 0 < r < w. This construction is often used as a basic mixing component in cryptographic primitives.We take a probability distribution approach here to provide results that are practical for cryptanalysis.
For a distribution to be of use to an analyst, it needs to boast a high divergence. This makes it easily distinguishable from a uniform distribution. In this context, all divergences of magnitude 1 and above are extremely high.
In the following we assume w-bit words, and we number the bit positions from least-to most significant bit 0 through w − 1. Also, for all rotation amounts r we assume that 0 < r < w.
Definition 3 (Probability distribution operator E).
A mapping f : U −→ V is said to generate a probability distribution on V (uniformly) in the following way. Starting with an empty array of size |V |, let each x ∈ U contribute probability 2 −|U | to slot f (x). Summation over all possible domain values produces the probability distribution in question. The probability distribution generated by f is denoted E(f ).
Thus, f w,r (x) and f w,r 1 (x 1 ) ⊕ . . . ⊕ f w,rn (x n ) = f w,r 1 ,...,rn (x 1 , . . . , x n ) generate probability distributions E(f w,r ) and E(f w,r 1 ,...,rn ), respectively.
Definition 4 (r-orbit).
In a w-bit word, the bit positions reachable from bit position i as we apply r-bit rotation again and again -the orbit of bit position i under r-bit rotation -is given by the bit set
and there are gcd(w, r) distinct orbits, each of length w gcd(w,r) . Proposition 1 (Divergence of E(f w,r )). The divergence of E(f w,r ) is gcd(w, r).
Proof. For every given w-bit output value y = y w−1 . . . y 0 , the equation system f w,r (x) = y has 2 gcd(w,r) solutions. That is, restricting the domain and range of f w,r to only one r-orbit, that corresponding equation system has precisely two solutions, and the restricted mapping is consequently 2-to-1. There are gcd(w, r) disjoint r-orbits, so the entire mapping f w,r is 2 gcd(w,r) -to-1. From this it follows that the probability distribution E(f w,r ) has precisely 2 w−gcd(w,r) non-zero probability entries, each being equal to 2 gcd(w,r)−w since x is uniformly distributed over the domain. Using (1) we get
w−gcd(w,r) 2 gcd(w,r)−w log 2 2 gcd(w,r)−w 2 −w = gcd(w, r).
We state a generalized version as Theorem 2, the proof of which can be found in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 2 (Divergence of E(f w,r 1 ,...,rn )). The divergence of E(f w,r 1 ,...,rn ) is gcd(w, r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n ).
The probability distribution E(f w,r 1 ,··· ,rn ) is precisely what we will need for our cryptanalysis of the HC-128 variant, so we will be content with these findings. A deepened RX analysis along the lines of Thomsen [11] and Rivest [9] with further results on E(g w,r 1 ,...,rn ) is available in the full version of this paper.
Application to HC-128
We now illustrate how Theorems 1 and 2 can be applied in a beautiful way to produce a new distinguisher for a partly linearized version of the stream cipher HC-128. In particular, we show that HC-128 becomes weak if its + operators are replaced with ⊕. Despite the removal of the non-linearity provided by modular addition, it is still not easy to construct low-complexity distinguishers for this variant of HC-128. This is because we still have to deal with the S-boxes.
Notation and Review of HC-128
In this section we give a very brief description of the original HC-128 keystream generation process. HC-128 is defined in [12] , from which we adopt and adapt the notation. HC-128 specifies both a key and initialization vector size of 128 bits. Up to 2 64 bits of keystream can be generated with each key/IV pair. Letting x and y be 32-bit integers, we have binary operators +, , ⊕, ||, ≫ and ≪ that denote 32-bit addition, subtraction modulo 512, xor, concatenation, and right and left rotation, respectively. The internal state of HC-128 consists of two tables denoted P and Q. Each table contains 512 words of 32 bits each. The keystream is denoted by s and the 32-bit keystream word generated at the i th step is denoted s i ; s = s 0 ||s 1 ||s 2 || . . ..
Keystream generation proceeds as follows. One table entry is updated and one 32-bit keystream word is generated at each step. One full update of an entire table P or Q takes place during a session consisting of 512 consecutive steps. First, table P is updated and table Q is used to provide update values. The roles of tables P and Q are reversed every session.
We will find it convenient to express table entries P [i] as P i , P [i j] as P i−j , and we write P k i−j for (P i−j ≫ k). Our analysis is independent of the initialization, so we leave that part out of this description referring to [12] .
Probabilistic equalities, equalities that are true with some given minimum probability, are indicated by annotating the equality sign with the corresponding probability.
A New HC-128 Variant Distinguisher
Table updates in the original HC-128 are performed according to
During the first half session we have 256 table updates with keystream generation
where 0 ≤ i, a ≤ 255 and 256 ≤ b ≤ 511. Similarly, the second half session provides 256 table updates with keystream generation
where 0 ≤ c ≤ 255 and 256 ≤ j, d ≤ 511. This completes one full update of table P . The subsequent session updates table Q, and for the three first updates we have
with 0 ≤ l, e, g ≤ 255 and 256 ≤ m, f, h ≤ 511. The P 's and Q's in Eq's. (3), (4) and (5) denote lookups into the same tables. Now consider the HC-128 variant for which all + operators are replaced by ⊕. Choosing any one equation triplet (3)(4)(5), we have i = l and j = m (and thus P i = P l and P j = P m ) each with probability 2 −8 . We also have a = e, c = g or a = g, c = e with combined probability 2 −15 (assume a = e, c = g without loss of generality). We similarly have (3) and (4) 
where the left-hand side consists of known keystream words only, and This yields a distinguisher requiring roughly 2 90.9 32-bit keystream words, so it is clear that the + operator plays a vital role in HC-128. If we use evaluation of the left-hand side of Eq. (6) over all three kvalues -four xor operations on 32-bit keystream words -as time unit, we obtain a time complexity of 2 89.9 . In absolute terms, this measure is much cheaper, a factor of at least 2 10 , than the cost of an initialization. For comparison, if we were to consider initializations instead, the time complexity of our distinguisher would be less than 2 80 .
Conclusions
We have presented some new and general results on probability distributions related to RX-systems. We have also shown how to apply the new theory to a non-trivial system that uses RX operations in combination with S-boxes. We did this by building a new distinguisher for a partly linearized variant of HC-128. The total time complexity of the new distinguisher is 2 89.9 very simple operations (xor and comparison of 32-bit keystream words) and the distinguisher requires about 2 90.9 32-bit keystream words.
